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WARRANTLESS ARRESTS IN POLICE STANDOFFS: A
COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO THE EXIGENCY
EXCEPTION

Elizabeth E. Forbes*
INTRODUCTION

I

The old adage "a man's home is his castle" reflects a bedrock principle
of our nation: we are protected from unreasonable governmental intrusions
behind the sanctity of our front doors.' This principle is embodied in the
Fourth Amendment, which grants "[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their . . . houses . . . against unreasona):>le searches and seizures.'" But
while we take comfort in the constitutional protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures within our homes, the question remains - what is
meant by the word "unreasonable"?
The Supreme Court provided the analytical framework for answering
this question in the landmark case of Payton v. New York." In Payton, the
Court held that police must generally get a warrant in order for a search or
seizure to be constitutionally reasonable, absent one exception.' If emergency circumstances exist, and due to these circumstances it is not possible
*Candidate for J.D., 2009, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of
Richmond (Manuscripts Editor of the University of Richmond Law Review). B.A.,
2005, University of Massachusetts - Amherst.
The author would like to thank Professor Corinna B. Lain for her interest in and
amazing support of this article.
1 See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 13 (1937); Ken Gormley, One
Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1358 (1992) (quoting Legal
Papers of John Adams, I, 137-38). This principle is traceable not only to English jurisprudence but even ancient law. See LASSON, supra.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. JV. The Fourth Amendment's history reflects the value
placed on the sanctity of the home. See Gormley, supra note I, at 1358. Its inclusfon
in the Constitution was a direct result of the broad search and seizure powers held by
the English monarchy at the time. Id. Seizures were indiscriminate, people and locations were not identified by warrant, and the government had the full power and
range to effectuate almost any type of search. LASSON, supra note l, at 26. In midseventeenth century England, however, critics began to speak out against general

Warrants and the general distrust of such pervasive police search and seizure power
migrated to the American colonies. Id. at 58-60.
3 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, JOOS. Ct. 1371, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980).
'Payton, 445 U.S. at 576. The process of obtaining a warrant is thought to impose
order by requiring a specific procedure be followed, and, most importantly, by havmg "a neutral and detached magistrate" make an '"informed and deliberate"' de-
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to obtain a warrant, the Supreme Court held that a search or seizure in the
home may be lawfully made without one. 5 The question then becomes, what
·
circumstances constitute exigency?
Herein lies the problem. The Supreme Court in Payton declined to
identify what circumstances would qualify as exigencies, or what test should
be applied by courts to determine if exigency exists.• Lower courts have
been left to grapple with the issue, and in so doing, have created a rather
large and extensive body of case law defining exigency. Exigency has been
thoroughly examined in the context of hot pursuit, destruction of evidence,
and protection of life and limb.' Unfortunately, a neglected area of inquiry
has been the issue of exigency in police standoff situations. In a postSeptember 11th world, police standoffs showcase the conflict between police
power that is necessary to diffuse deadly situations, and the Fourth Amendment values we as a society hold so dear.
Recently, the Ninth Circuit held as a matter of first impression that police must continuously reevaluate the presence of exigent circumstances during a standoff, and obtain a warrant if exigency abates at any time.' This differs from the Sixth Circuit's position on this issue, which is that a police
exigency continues throughout the duration of a standoff if it is found to
have existed at the start, completely excusing the warrant requirement.' With
an emerging circuit split on the issue, and almost nothing in current scholarship to guide courts or police, the time has come to evaluate the exigency
exception to the warrant requirement in the context of police standoffs.
termination on the issue of whether probable cause exists. Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S.
10, 13-14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948) (quoting U.S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S.
452, 464, 52 S. Ct. 420, 76 L. Ed. 877, 82 A.L.R. 775 (1932)). Police officers should
not be the final determination on whether probable cause exists for a seizure, because
of their inherent bias as they engage "in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime.'' Id.
5
Payton, 445 U.S. at 603.
6
Payton, 445 U.S. at 749.
7
See generally Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164
L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006) (holding that police can enter a home without a warrant to end
violence); U.S. v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1976)
(holding that a suspect cannot evade an arrest that starts in public by fleeing into his
home);.Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 8'1 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L.
Ed. 2d 782 (1967) (holding that entering a home without a warrant to apprehend a
fleeing suspect is justified through exigency); Ker v. State of Cal., 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.
Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963) (holding that ifthere is a substantial likelihood
evidence will be destroyed, exigency justifies a warrantless entry).
6
See Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g en bane
granted, 519 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2008), on reh'g en bane, 558 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir.
2009). Subsequent to this decision, a rehearing en bane was granted on March 14,
2008. Fisher v. City of San Jose, 519 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2008), on reh'g en bane, 558
F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2009). Ultimately, the issue will not be resolved until the
Supreme Court decides to grant certiorari.
9
See Bing ex rel. Bing v. City of Whitehall, Ohio, 456 F.3d 555, 2006 FED App.

0270P (6th Cir. 2006).
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In the discussion that follows, I argue that exigency in police standoff
situations should be governed by the clearer, more common sense rule
adopted by the Sixth Circuit - namely that exigency exists due to the inherent danger of a police standoff, and is not negated by the mere passage of
time. Part I provides a backdrop for the discussion, presenting an overview
of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on exigency cases. Part II discusses
the differing Sixth Circuit and Ninth Circuit approaches to exigency in police standoffs. Part III argues that the better position on exigency in police
standoff situations is the Sixth Circuit approach, because it provides a clear
rule for police and courts to apply. In the end, courts should give heed to
common sense in recognizing that standoffs are inherently dangerous and as /
such constitute exigent circumstances.
·

I. DOCTRINAL LANDSCAPE: THE SUPREME COURT'S
INADEQUATE GUIDE TO EXIGENCY
Although the Supreme Court declined to provide a test or framework to
determine exigency in Payton, it has taken a number of cases since that address the issue. These cases create a give and take of sorts, in that some of
the cases grant police broad power to act without warrants, while other cases
simultaneously impose limitations that restrict that power. Unfortunately,
the cases are so fact specific that they offer little guidance for lower courts.

A. The Supreme Court Gives
The Supreme Court since Payton has identified three specific exigent
circumstances where a warrantless arrest in the home is constitutional. These
exigency exceptions are: hot pursuit, the destruction of evidence, and serious
threat of bodily injury. 10 If any of these delineated exigencies exist, police
have broad authority to arrest without first obtaining a warrant. In fact, this
authority is so broad that the Supreme Court has held an officer's subjective
intent to be irrelevant if one of the exceptions exists. 11
The first, and perhaps the most common exception to the warrant requirement is hot pursuit. The Supreme Court held in Warden v. Hayden 12 that
when police start to make an arrest in public, but the arrestee flees into his or
her home to avoid police, a warrantless arrest in the home is justified.13 The
public policy considerations of this exception are paramount. 14 First, police
must be able to protect their own lives and those of the public by quickly aplO PAUL R. JOSEPH, wARRANTLESS SEARCH LA w DESKBOOK 19-9 to 19-16 (Clark,
Boardman, Callaghan 1993) (1991).
11
See Brigham, 547 U.S. at 398.
12 Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed.
2d 782 (1967).
13
Warden, 387 U.S. at 298-99.
14
Warden, 387 U.S. at 298-99.
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prehending a fleeing arrestee." Second, an arrestee should not be able to find
safe harbor from police by fleeing into his home. The Constitution protects
against unwarranted goverrunental intrusions in the home, not an arrestee's
right to call "home base" as in a childhood game of tag. The Supreme Court
in United States v. Santana'• further clarified that the term hot pursuit, while
requiring "some sort of chase," does not need to be "an extended hue and
cry 'in and about (the) public streets."'" The hot pursuit exception can be
invoked in any situation in which a person evades arrest by retreating into
the home. 1•
The hot pursuit exigency exception is generally not a good fit to justify a
warrantless arrest during a police standoff. While it is true that an extensive
police chase does not have to exist to invoke this exception, the minimum
requirement is that the police attempt an arrest outside of the home, with the
arrestee then fleeing inside. Therefore, in cases in which police do not first
attempt the arrest outside of the home, this exception is not applicable.
Second, the Supreme Court has also carefully carved out an exigency
exception to protect against the destruction of evidence. In Ker v. California, 19 police entered the home of a suspected narcotics dealer who was on
notice that their arrival was imminent.'0 Police entered his home and arrested
him without a warrant, as they were concerned that in the time it took to get
a warrant, he would dispose of the drugs." The Supreme Court found that
exigency justified the warrantless arrest because of the large possibility that
evidence would be destroyed. 22 While recognizing the protection that the
Fourth Amendment provides against unreasonable seizures, the Supreme
Court opined that "suspects have no constitutional right to dispose of or destroy evidence.' ' 23

This exception is not applicable in a police standoff situation. Generally,
there is no evidence that is in danger of being destroyed in a police standoff.
The general application of this exception will be cases in which there are
narcotics present, as these are easy to dispose of quickly. Although there are
weapons present in a standoff that are usually evidence of the crime, there
would not feasibly be a way to dispose of them in the home.
Third, the Supreme Court has further recognized exigency when police
15

Warden, 387 U.S. at 298-99.
U.S. v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300 ('1976).
17
Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43. In fact, the suspect in Santana was standing in the
doorway to her home when police announced their presence. Id. at 40. She retreated
into her home, and this was deemed sufficient for hot pursuit. Id. "The fact that the
pursuit here ended almost as soon as it began did not render it any the less a 'hot
pursuit' sufficient to justify the warrantless entry into Santana's house." Id. at 43.
18
See Santana, 427 U.S. at 43.
19
Ker v. State of Cal., 374 U.S. 23, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1963).
2
°Ker, 374 U.S. at 40.
21
Ker, 374 U.S. at 40.
22
Ker, 374 U.S. at40-41.
"Ker, 374 U.S. at 39.
16
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"need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such
injury. " 24 In Brigham City v. Stuart, 25 the Court examined the Fourth
Amendment in relation to the preservation of life and protection of individuals from bodily injury.•• Police saw a fight break out inside a home and
entered, breaking up the altercation and arresting those involved." The
Supreme Court upheld the warrantless arrests, reasoning that police needed
to intervene to protee<t the occupants." The Court made clear that in balancing justifications, the need to protect life or avoid serious injury outweighs
the protections of the Fourth Amendment, and to hold otherwise would be
"silly. " 29 Therefore, the Supreme Court has found that exigency vitiates the
warrant requirement in such life or death situations.30
This exigency exception applies in police standoffs. The batricaded arrestee presents a real and serious threat of bodily injury, not only to
themselves, but also to the public at large and officers on the scene. The issue
in police standoffs really is not which exigency exception applies, as it clearly
is the threat of serious bodily injury, but rather when is exigency assessed?
Is the threat one that exists at the start and therefore throughout a standoff?
Or as time passes, can the exigency abate to the point that a warrant is
required? Later Supreme Court cases examine exigency over extended durations of time, and these cases are to some extent more useful for the standoff
analysis than the basic threat of bodily injury cases.
B. The Supreme Court Takes

While the Supreme Court has recognized a few exigency exceptions,
and thus given broad powers to police to work without warrants, the Court
has subsequently taken some of this power away by limiting the circumstances in which warrantless arrests can be effectuated. Namely, the Supreme
Court has stated that the offense must be sufficiently serious in nature to
justify a warrantless arrest in the home due to exigent circumstances. 31 In
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 32 the Supreme Court examined the warrantless arrest of
a man in his home after he left the scene of an accident he caused while driv24

I

l
,A

Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed.
2d 650 (2006).
25
Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650
(2006).
"Brigham, 547 U.S. at 403.
27
Brigham, 547 U.S. at 401.
28
Brigham, 547 U.S. at 406.
29
Brigham, 547 U.S. at 406 ("It would be silly to suggest that the police would
commit a tort by entering . . . to determine whether violence (or threat of violence)
has just occurred or is about to (or soon will) occur." (quoting Georgia v. Rarn;lolph,
547 U.S. 103, 118, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 164 L. Ed. 2d 208 (2006))).
30
See Brigham, 547 U.S. at 406.
31
See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732
(1984).
32
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1984).
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ing drunk. 33 The government argued that under the facts of the case, there
were two exigencies to justify the warrantless arrest - hot pursuit and destruction of evidence. 34 The Supreme Court first rejected the hot pursuit
argument, recognizing that "there was no immediate or continuous pursuit
of the petitioner from the scene of a crime.' ' 35 Also, since the arrestee had
gone home and left his car, he was no longer a threat to public safety. 36
Interestingly, the Court did not expressly determine whether the need to
quickly obtain the arrestee's blood alcohol level would qualify for the destruction of evidence exigency exception to the warrant requirement."' The
Court recognized that even if the possibility of destruction of evidence
existed, it would not, under the facts of this case, be sufficient justification
for exigency without a more serious underlying offense. 38 While the Court
found the seriousness of the offense to be one factor in a totality of the circumstances analysis, it simultaneously found that the government would
rarely be able to prevail under exigency if the offense was minor."' Effectively then, the seriousness of the offense is not so much a factor in a
totality of the circumstances analysis, but rather is a preliminary requirement
for a claim of exigent circumstances. 40
The Supreme Court in Welsh declined to articulate a bright line standard
for what crimes qualify as "serious offenses."" In fact, while the Court
noted numerous lower court decisions that considered the seriousness of the
offense, it refused to approve of any of the holdings or address more factual
scenarios." In determining what crimes are serious enough to merit the
exigency exception, however, most lower courts look to the legislative body
of that jurisdiction to see how the crime is classified, as well as the pnnishment associated with the crirne. 43 Generally, only violent crimes will qualify
as serious enough to merit the exigency exception." In both the Sixth Circuit
and Ninth Circuit cases involving police standoffs discussed in this article,
an underlying felony was committed to justify the claim of exigency."
33

Welsh, 466 U.S. at 742-43.
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 742-43.
35
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 742-43.
36
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 742-43.
37
Welsh, 466 p".S. at 754.
38
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754.
39
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753. The Court did not provide any examples in which
exigency would justify a warrantless home arrest for a minor offense. See id.
40
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 759 (White, J., dissenting).
41
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753 (majority opinion).
42
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753.
34

43

44

supra note 10, at 19-2.
JOSEPH, supra note 10, at 19-2.
JOSEPH,

45

Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g en bane
granted, 519 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2008), on reh'g en bane, 558 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir.
472
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C. Time Marches On

None of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on exigency applies specifically to police standoff situations. One of the most notable problems in
analyzing exigency for police standoffs is that standoffs involve a considerable passage of time. All of the previously noted exceptions involve a warrantless arrest following immediately on the heels of an emergency situation.
What happens when exigency exists, but many hours pass? Does this time
affect the exigency? Two cases addressed by the Supreme Court do concern
exigency over a period of time, which is the closest the Supreme Court has
come to giving guidance that could be used in determining whether eiigency
exists in a police'standoff. The two Supreme Court cases, Mincey v. Arizona.,.
and Michigan v. Tyler, 47 were heavily relied on by both the Sixth Circuit in
Bing v. City of Whitehall" and the Ninth Circuit in Fisher v. City of San
Jose" in their analyses of exigency during police standoffs. Unfortunately
the Supreme Court cases, while nqt being directly on point, are also difficult
to reconcile with one another, thus further exacerbating the confusion for
lower courts.
In Michigan v. Tyler, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
the mere passage of time can negate exigency, thereby imposing the warrant
requirement on a Fourth Amendment event that had previously not required
a warrant.'0 The case involved a nighttime fire that was believed to be the
result of arson. 51 After the fire had been reduced to mere embers, detectives
arrived at the scene and began a search without a warrant." Due to the heavy
smoke and lack of light, the men left the scene and returned four hours later,
in the daylight, continuing again without a warrant." The second entry was a
much more thorough search, which included removing portions of the carpeting and stairs. 54 First, the Court recognized that the fire qualified as an exigent
circumstance that justified the initial warrantless entry. 55 The Court reasoned
that an important function of firefighters is to determine the cause of a fire,
and this must be done promptly to prevent reoccurrence as well as preserve
2009); Bing ex rel. Bing v. City of Whitehall, Ohio, 456 F.3d 555, 565, 2006 FED
App. 0270P (6th Cir. 2006).
46 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978).
47 Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1978).
48 Bing ex rel. Bing v. City of Whitehall, Ohio, 456 F.3d 555, 2006 FED App.
0270P (6th Cir. 2006).
49
Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2007), reh' g en bane granted,
519 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2008), on reh'g en bane, 558 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2009).
50
Tyler, 436 U.S. at 511.
51
Tyler, 436 U.S. at 502.
52
Tyler, 436 U.S. at 502.
53
Tyler, 436 U.S. at.502.
54
Tyler, 436 U.S. at 502.
55
Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509.
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evidence." The Court noted that to require a warrant as soon as the last
flame was extinguished would put too much of a burden on fire
investigators. 57 The issue then was whether a warrant was needed for the
second entry, as four hours had passed since the initial exigent entry into the
building.'" The Supreme Court held that since the original warrantless search
of the building was reasonable due to the exigency of the fire, the later entry
was also reasonable, and was simply a continuation of the first."
Just Jess than a month after the decision in Tyler, the Supreme Court
decided Mincey v. Arizona, another case that examined whether exigency
dissipates due to the passage of time. In Mincey, the Supreme Court declined
to apply the exigency exception to a warrantless homicide search that began
with an initial sweep for safety, but lasted for over four days. 60 Police had arranged an undercover drug bust of an apartment, which did not go according
to plan, and an officer was shot and killed in a fire exchange inside the
apartment. 61 Immediately after the officer was shot, police quickly looked
about the apartment for other victims, but refrained from conducting a full
scale search of the crime scene at that time. 62 Within ten minutes however,
homicide investigators were on the scene, and so began a four-day search of
64
the apartment."' During this period, police did not obtain a warrant. The
Supreme Court rejected the government's argument of exigent
circumstances. 05 The Court did not question the general right of police to respond to emergency situations without a warrant, but reiterated that a homicide investigation presented no such emergency. 66 While a prompt, warrantless sweep of a crime scene is appropriate to protect life, a four-day search is
not appropriate without a warrant."' The Court opined, "[a]ll the persons in
Mincey's apartment had been located before the investigating homicide officers arrived there and began their search. And a four-day search that
included opening dresser drawers and ripping up carpets can hardly be
rationalized in terms of the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency
search. " 68
Unfortunately, the decisions in Tyler and Mincey are difficult to
" Tyler, 436 U.S. at 510.
57 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 509-10.
68 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 510-11.
59 Tyler, 436 U.S. at 510-11.
60 Mincer~- Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S. Ct. 2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978).
81 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395.
82 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 388.
83 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 388-89.
64 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 389.
66 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392-93.
Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393.
67 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395.
88 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 395. In fact, the search was so thorough that:

66

the entire apartment was searched, photographed, and diagrammed. The officers
opened drawers, closets, and cupboards, and inspected their contents; they
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reconcile. Tyler stands for the principle that once exigency justifies a warrantless search, the search can continue over a period of hours, even if interrupted, without a warrant.•• Alternatively, Mincey requires a warrant immediately after exigency abates.'0 In terms of applying this precedent to
police standoffs, the application of each case results in different conclusions.
Tyler would not require a warrant, as long as exigency is found to exist at the
start of a police standoff, even if considerable time passes from the inception
of the standoff until the arrest. However, Mincey would mandate that as soon
as the initial exigency dissipates, a warrant is required. The analysis under
the precedent in Mincey would hinge on whether or not exigency is found to
be continuous throughout the duration of a standoff. Given these two
conflicting Supreme Court cases, it is no surprise that lower courts are reaching differenfoonclusions regarding exigency during police standoffs.

II. A TALE OF TWO CIRCUITS: DOES EXIGENCY NEED TO
BE CONTINUOUSLY EVALUATED DURING A POLICE
STANDOFF?
Recently, both the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit were confronted
with the question of whether exigency exists during a police standoff. In a
police standoff, the safety of the officers and the public comes into direct
conflict with the barricaded arrestee's constitutional rights, thus showcasing
the delicate balance that exists between protecting Fourth Amendment rights
and protecting public safety. While the facts of both cases are reasonably
similar, the rulings the courts reached are not, resulting in an emerging circuit
split.
A. The Sixth Circuit Standard: Bing v. City of Whitehall

In 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of
exigency during a police standoff. 71 On October 14, 2002, William Bing left
his house in an intoxicated state and fired a gun into the air and ground
outside of his home." Witnesses called police, who upon arrival, learned
that Bing had retreated into his home. 73 Within minutes, police surrounded
emptied clothing pockets; they dug bullet fragments out of the walls and floors;
they pulled up sections of the carpet and removed them for examination. Every
item in the apartment was closely examined and inventoried, and 200-to 300
objects were seized. In short, Mincey's apartment was subjected to an exhaustive and intrusive search. Id. at 389.
69

See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 510-11, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486
(1978).
0
' See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394-95.
71
Bing ex rel. Bing v. City of Whitehall, Ohio, 456 F.3d 555, 558, 2006 FED
App. 0270P (6th Cir. 2006).
72
Bing, 456 F.3d at 559.
73
Bing, 456 F.3d at 559.
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the house and established a perimeter." Police called in a SWAT team, who
tried unsuccessfully to communicate with Bing." Fearing for the safety of
the community, the police advised neighbors to evacuate their homes, but
the neighbors refused to comply." The police further learned that they had
previously been to Bing's home in response to shots fired, thus increasing
their'concem about the situation." Shortly after using a f!ashbang device,
police heard shots from inside the home. 78 They entered and shot and killed
Bing in an exchange of fire. 79 By this time, the standoff had lasted for over
five hours, and no police action during that time was conducted pursuant to
warrant.'0 The lawsuit, filed by Bing's estate, alleged a violation of Bing's
Fourth Amendment rights when police entered his home without a warrant."
The government countered by claiming that exigent circumstances negated
the warrant requirement. 82
In conducting its analysis, the Sixth Circuit in Bing first looked to when
the arrest took place." The court determined that "[b ]y laying siege to Bing's
house, breaking his door and windows, and employing pepper gas, the police accomplished a de facto house arrest, i.e., a Fourth Amendment
seizure."" Bing was considered seized when his home was surrounded,
because while not formally arrested, he was barricaded in his home and police coercion exercised physical control over him. 85 At the time police surrounded Bing's home, placing him under de facto arrest, the court found that
exigent circumstances were present, due to the immediate threat Bing posed
to both police and innocent bystanders. 88 Therefore, the court held that a
warrant was not required at that particular juncture."
The court in Bing then looked to the more difficult question of whether
the mere passage of time negated the original exigency. 88 The court opined
that because Bing was dangerous at all times during the standoff, the
exigency did not expire. 89 The court explained, "[t]he passage of time did
not terminate the exigency because the ticking of the clock did nothing to cut
Bing, 456 F.3d at 559.
Bing, 456 F.3d at 560.
78 Bing, 456 F .3d at 559-60.
77 Bing, 456 F.3d at 560.
78 Bing, 456 F.3d at 561.
79 Bing, 45fF.3d at 562.
80 See Bing, 456 F .3d at 562.
81 Bing, 456 F .3d at 558.
82 See Bing, 456 F.3d at 564.
83 Bing, 456 F .3d at 564.
84 Bing, 456 F.3d at 564.
85 Bing, 456 F.3d at 564.
88 Bing, 456 F.3d at 564.
87 Bing, 456 F.3d at 564.
88 Bing, 456 F.3d at 565.
89 Bing, 456 F.3d at 565.
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off Bing's access to his gun, or cure him of his willingness to fire it, or move
0
to safety the people nearby who refused to evacuate. "' The court looked to
the Supreme Court's decision in Mincey, which stated "[e]xigent circum91
stances terminate when the factors creating the exigency are negated.' '
Since Bing continued to be a dangerous threat, the exigency never abated
during the police standoff.''
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit in Bing found that the arrest occurred when
Bing's house was surrounded, and exigent circumstances justified that warrantless arrest. 03 Since the threat Bing posed did not cease throughout the
standoff, the court found that neither did the exigency." In short 1 the court
held that the later actions of the police were justified by the same exigency
that justified the original arrest, or surrounding of Bing's home." Therefore,
the Sixth Circuit held that Bing's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated
- it was reasonable for the police to act without a warrant."
B. The Ninth Circuit Standard: Fisher v. City of San Jose

In 2007, the Ninth Circuit decided Fisher v. City of San Jose," a very
similar case to Bing involving exigency during a police standoff. On October
23, 1999, a security guard was investigating a complaint of noise emanating
from the apartment above that of Steven Fisher." Fisher's ground floor apartment had a sliding glass window that led to an enclosed patio, into which
passersby could see. 09 The guard saw Fisher and motioned him outside so
the two men could speak.1°0 The guard asked Fisher about the noise, but
Fisher was generally umesponsive.1°1 Fisher seemed to be intoxicated, and
instead of answering the guard's questions, began rambling about his Second
Amendment rights. 102 During this conversation, Fisher was holding his rifle
in various positions.103 Feeling uncomfortable, the guard notified his superviBing, 456 F.3d at 565.
Bing, 456 F.3d at 565 (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S. Ct.
2408, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978)).
92 Bing, 456 F.3d at 565.
93 Bing, 456 F.3d at 564.
94 Bing, 456 F.3d at 565.
"Bing, 456 F.3d at 564-65.
00 Bing, 456 F.3d at 569.
90
91

97 Fisher v. City of San Jose, 509 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2007), reh'g en bane granted,
519 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2008), on reh'g en bane, 558 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2009).
98 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 954.
99 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 954.
100 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 954-55.
101 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 955.
102 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 955.
103 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 955.
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sor, who in turn contacted police.1°' The first officer on the scene also attempted to communicate with Fisher, but again, he seemed intoxicated and
not particularly coherent.'°' Police surrounded the apartment, and numerous
officers came to the scene during the standoff.1°" Shortly after arriving at the
scene, police discovered that Fisher had been drinking and had eighteen
rifles in his apartment. ' 0 ' A few hours into the standoff, Fisher threatened a
tactical negotiator, and police determined the act to be the commission of a
felony. 108 Soon after, Fisher pointed his rifles at police, and moved around
the apartment with the rifles. 10' Police concern regarding public safety was
particularly high, so all of the nearby residents were evacuated from their
apartments about six hours into the standoff. 110 After about twelve hours of
standoff, Fisher emerged from his apartment and was arrested, without a
warrant. m Ultimately, Fisher brought suit, claiming that his warrantless arrest was an unreasonable seizure and a violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights. 112
The Ninth Circuit in Fisher first examined whether the Payton warrant
requirement applied to the facts of the case. 11' While Fisher's formal arrest
took place outside of his home, the court recognized that this was not in fact
a public arrest, but rather an in home arrest, thereby requiring a warrant.'"
The court reasoned that "every court that has considered the issue, including
our own, has concluded that if the police force a person out of his house to
arrest him, the arrest is deemed to have taken place inside his home, and the
Payton warrant requirement applies.''"' The court, upon determining that
the Payton warrant requirement applied, then looked to whether exigency
existed to excuse the lack of warrant.'"
In examining the issue of exigency, the Ninth Circuit recognized that
time was worthy of consideration. 117 The court articulated that implicit in
exigency is the idea that the interest of time in an emergency hampers the
509 F.3d at 955.
509 F.3d at 955.
509 F.3d at 956.
509 F.3d at 955.
509 F.3d at 955. Despite the fact that Fisher committed a felony, was
pointing rifles at police, and moving the rifles around his apartment, no officer communicated to Fisher that he was under arrest. Id.
109
Fisher, 50~ F.3d at 955.
11° Fisher, 509 F.3d at 955-56.
m See Fisher, 509 F.3d at 956.
112
Fisher, 509 F.3d at 956.
113
Fisher, 509 F.3d at 958; see also supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
114
Fisher, 509 F.3d at 959-60.
"'Fisher, 509 F.3d at 959 (citing U.S. v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir.
1980), judgment aff'd, 457 U.S. 537, 102 S. Ct. 2579, 73 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1982)).
116 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 960.
117
Fisher, 509 F.3d at 961.
164

Fisher,
Fisher,
106 Fisher,
107 Fisher,
108
Fisher,
10
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ability to obtain a warrant.'" The Ninth Circuit in Fisher agreed with the
reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in Bing that the appropriate moment to assess
"whether the requirements for the exigency exception are met is the mo119
ment at which any entry to effect an arrest or to conduct a search occurs. "
This appears to be the last place where the two courts reach the same
conclusions.
Following the Sixth Circuit's basic examination of exigency, and after
agreeing with the Sixth Circuit's exigency definitions, the Ninth Circuit in
Fisher took a drastic turn from the reasoning employed by the Sixth Circuit
in Bing. The Ninth Circuit, after recognizing that a suspect is seized at the
time police surround his home, drew a distinction between this seizure and
the subsequent formal arrest. 120 The court reasoned:
[D]espite having been seized, it is indisputable that Fisher had not yet
been placed under formal arrest and brought into the custody of the
police. Because Fisher remained in his house, not free to leave but not in
the custody of police, ~e continued to be subjected to entries into his
home for the purpose of forcing him outside to arrest him, and the Pay~
121
ton warrant requirement continued to apply .

Since the court in Fisher did not consider a formal arrest to have occurred at
the time Fisher's home was surrounded, it opined that every subsequent
seizure or entry into Fisher's home required a separate analysis of whether
exigency existed at the time of that entry or seizure-"' According to the
Ninth Circuit, exigency could dissipate if the danger posed by the suspect
decreased, or if through the passage of time, resources became available to
police to allow them to maintain safety while obtaining a warrant.'"
Ultimately, the court in Fisher held that exigency must be continuously
examined throughout the duration of a police standoff to justify warrantless
police action. 124 While the court considered a seizure to have taken place at
the time Fisher's home was surrounded, they made a distinction between
this seizure and a formal arrest.'" Since the court found that the formal arrest
was a separate and distinct Fourth Amendment event from the informal
seizure of the home, this subsequent event was subject to a new Fourth
Amendment exigency analysis.''" The distinction between the court's holding and the Sixth Circuit approach, the court maintained, was not in the stan12
dard articulated, but rather the application of the standard to distinct facts. '
Fisher, 509 F.3d at 961.
Fisher, 509 F.3d at 961.
12• Fisher, 509 F.3d at 965.
121 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 965.
122 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 965-66.
123 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 968.
"'Fisher, 509 F.3d at 965.
126 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 965.
126 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 967-68.
127 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 967-68.
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The court found that the standoff in Fisher involved significantly less danger
than the standoff in Bing. 128 Because it held that the formal arrest was a separate Fourth Amendment event, and the exigency had abated by this time, the
court held a warrant was required for the arrest. 129
While the majority opinion in Fisher saw its holding as paralleling the
SiXth Circuit's holding in Bing, in reality, these two cases cannot be
reconciled." 0 The first approach, adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Bing,
presumes that if exigency exists at the start of a standoff, it is presumed to
exist for the duration, because standoffs are inherently dangerous. 131 The
second standard, adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Fisher, requires an examination of exigency not only at the connuencement of a standoff, but also
with every police action throughout the duration of the standoff.'" With this
emerging circuit split, the question becomes, now what?

Ill. WHERE TO FROM HERE: COMMON SENSE MAKES
SENSE
In examining a police standoff, the courts are attempting a balancing act
between the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment and the safety of society.
With the Sixth Circuit position emphasizing the former, and the Ninth Circuit
position emphasizing the latter, determining which of these positions, and
therefore societal ideas, should prevail in the instance of a police standoff is
difficult. But in assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses of these approaches, although the Ninth Circuit's standard does have its benefits, the
Sixth Circuit standard is ultimately the better reasoned, more connuon sense
rule for the reasons discussed below.

A. The Ninth Circuit Rule: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
The Ninth Circuit standard - requiring exigency to be continually assessed throughout the duration of a police sta11doff - does have the notable
Fisher, 509 F.3d at 967-68. These facts clearly distinguish this case from
Bing, a case that is in some respects quite similar to this one. Bing had fired his gun
in the vicinity ofneighborbood children, 'police had been called to Bing's residence
in the past [because] he previously had fired shots,' neighborhood residents refused
to evacuate thereby increasing the danger, and police had reason to believe that Bing
had fired a shot at police officers before they raided his apartment. Bing ex rel. Bing
v. City of Whitehall, Ohio, 456 F.3d 555, 558-62, 2006 FED App. 0270P (6th Cir.
2006). None of these factors existed in Fisher's standoff with police. Moreover, as
far as appears in the Bing opinion, none of the police on the scene returned to the
station during the standoff. The level of danger in Bing was thus considerably higher
128

than here, while the officers' opportunity to obtain an arrest warrant was not obvious.

Fisher, 509 F.3d at 967.
129
See Fisher, 509 F.3d at 965-66.
13
°Fisher, 509 F.3d at 976 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
131
Fisher, 509 F.3d at 976.
132
See Fisher, 509 F.3d at 976.
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benefit that it is a better check on police power. By requiring a warrant if
exigency dissipates, the Ninth Circuit standard does a better job of protecting the Fourth Amendment's special protection of the home - chiefly by
requiring a warrant unless police cannot obtain one. By requiring the input
of a neutral and detached magistrate, the Ninth Circuit provides a constraint
on police power that the Sixth Circuit does not.
Although the Nmth Circuit standard does have these benefits, there are
three significant drawbacks to the standard. First, and perhaps most worrisome, application of the Ninth Circuit standard by police in the field is
problematic, if not virtually impossible. The decision m Fisher is unclear m
articulating exactly when police are required to get a warrant."' Police officers, while usmg their judgment to end a standoff safely, must also use judgment to try and avoid future litigation. 134 While most would think a police
standoff is dangerous and exigent from start to finish, this is not the standard
the Ninth Circuit applies. Instead, police are to "obtam a warrant . . . ifthe
initial exigency dissipates sufficiently." 135 At what point did exigency sufficiently dissipate during the Fisher standoff? After Fisher had been in his
apartment for two hours, three hours? When he stopped moving? When the
neighbors had been evacuated? It seems desperately unfair to hold police to
a standard that even legal professionals cannot articulate.
Second, the Ninth Circuit's approach flies m the face of precedent."" If a
warrantless arrest is justified by exigency, no warrant is later required for
that same arrest.137 While the Ninth Circuit conceded that surrounding the
home was an arrest, the court failed to confront the problem of requiring a
warrant to justify a seizure that already occurred.136 The Fourth Amendment
does not require retroactive or post-hoc warrants, as to do so would be
unreasonable.139 The entire idea behind exigency is to make a Fourth Amendment event constitutionally valid. 140 In fact, the dissent in Fisher recognized
that
in every case where exigent circumstances justified an initial intrusion, the
exigency 'dissipated' in some manner -whether because the suspect is arrested after a hot pursuit, the premises are secured to prevent an escape
or destruction of evidence, or a danger to the public is neutralized. We
have never required the officers to, after the fact, go back and obtain a
141
warrant to justify the initial lawful intrusion.

A standoff is a contmuation of the original arrest, the first and only Fourth
See Fisher, 509 F.3d at 977.
See Fisher, 509 F.3d at 977.
135 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 962 (majority opinion).
136 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 974-76 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
137 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 971.
136 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 971.
139 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 972.
140 See Fisher, 509 F.3d at 972.
141
Fisher, 509 F.3d at 972.
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Amendment event, and that warrantless arrest was justified due to
exigency. 142
Third, and finally, the Ninth Circuit standard engages in "arm-chair
quarterback[ing]." 143 It seems inherently unfair for judges, in the safety of
ch~mbers, to question police decisions made in the heat of the moment.'"
The dissent in Fisher argued that "[s]uch post-game analysis is disconnected from reality and leads to the puzzling determination in tills case that
San Jose police officers need training despite . . . [doing] nothlng wrong."'"
This "arm-chair quarterback[ing]" is even evidenced by the phraseology
used throughout the case. Many of the facts cited were facts known to the officers only after resolution of the matter. In fact, one of the first paragraphs
of the opinion describes facts that were not readily available to officers during the standoff, but rather were facts from the viewpoint of Fisher himself.
The Ninth Circuit begins its recitation of the facts with, "[o]n the afternoon
of Saturday, October 23, 1999, Fisher bought two twelve-packs of beer and
settled in at home for an evening of watching the World Series and cleaning
rifles from his collection of approximately eighteen World War II-era
fireanns.' " 46 From the police perspective at the time of the standoff, Fisher
was not your average baseball watcher. He was an intoxicated, gun wielding
man who was an extreme danger to the community. To later question police
decisions is ludicrous, particularly with access to facts unknown at the time.
B. The Sixth Circuit Rule: The Good or Just Better?

The Sixth Circuit rule also has its shortcomings. First, it allows police
power to go essentially unchecked during a police standoff. By removing the
power of the detached magistrate, we "permit officers to invade the sanctity
147
of the home indefinitely and in new, and more intrusive ways. "
The
purpose of a warrant is to limit the actions of police. Theoretically, if a
standoff continues for many hours, the police can continue to do whatever is
necessary to force a subject out of his home, and have no warrant for any
activity. The Sixth Circuit standard also fails'to consider the ease with which
warrants can be obtained. Only one officer would have to leave the scene of
a standoff. 146
All things being equal, however, the Sixth Circuit standard is the better
Fisher, 509 F.3d at 972.
Fisher, 509 F.3d at 969.
144 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 969.
145 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 969.
146 Fisher, 509 F .3d at 954 (majority opinion).
141 Fisher, 509 F.3d at 964.
148 In fact, in Fisher, the majority opinion articulates this point, saying:

142

143

(s]ome of the original officers left the scene at 7 a.m. and returned to the station
house, where they or their colleagues could have initiated warrant proceedings.
By 1 p.m., many officers had been at Fisher's apartment complex for several

hours; in total, more than 60 officers participated over the course of the standoff
between the police and Fisher.
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reasoned, easier to apply, more bright-line rule. First, it is simple common
sense that there is a threat of serious bodily injury throughout the entire
duration of a police stand off, thus the standoff constitutes exigent circumstances from start to finish. In fact, ifthere was no threat of bodily injury, to
either police or the public, there wouldn't be a police standoff in the first
place. Police would leave the scene, because there would be no immediate
reason to arrest. It is ridiculous logic to claim that a police standoff is not
dangerous the entire time. If one finds that a standoff constitutes exigent circumstances from start to finish, then no warrant is required, as under the
Sixth Circuit standard.
Second, the Sixth Circuit standard is superior to that of the Ninth Circuit
because it does not overly regulate police. Police are skilled at defusing
potentially deadly situations. There is reason to believe they have good
judgment. Not only do police complete numerous hours of training, but they
also have on the job experience. It seems a bit ridiculous for judges or common citizens to overanalyze police action in such situations, when neither
has the training or experience to form such judgments. Using hindsight to
question police on their proficiency at handling standoffs is a fruitless and
unreasonable exercise.
Third and finally, the standard articulated by the Sixth Circuit is clear.
Police in the field know what actions are allowed and what actions are not.
Police will be aware that once a decision is made regarding exigency, they
are justified in using reasonable means to effectuate a formal arrest and take
the arrestee into custody. It is the job of the courts to articulate legal standards and clarify what actions will subject a person to litigation. It would be
somewhat useless to have a standard that is impossible to apply, such as that
of the Ninth Circuit. What purpose would such a rule have?

CONCLUSION
The danger that exists in a police standoff is incredible. Officers are
called upon to make tactical decisions that may determine life or death.
Simultaneously, the Fourth Amendment is implicated during police standoffs
as the lone barrier to unchecked police power. The Fourth Amendment's key
phrase, however, is "reasonable." When other demands outweigh the
reasonableness of protecting a person from seizure within his home, the
Fourth Amendment still allows the police action. Interestingly, both cases
examined by the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit ended with no innocent
fatalities. One could wonder, if the cases had ended differently, how that
would have affected the outcomes. The protection of life is ultimately a reasonable justification for allowing police the power to arrest without a warrant in a police standoff.
Unfortunately, there are two different approaches to dealing with
exigency during a police standoff situation. While the issue is anything but
clear for courts, the likelihood of either Bing or Fisher being successfully
Fisher, 509 F.3d at 967.
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appealed to the Supreme Court is low. The Supreme Court has previously
had numerous chances to define and explore exigency, all of which the Court
has openly dismissed. Unfortuuately, this leaves lower courts to struggle in
defining aud applying exigeucy in all contexts, as well as in police standoffs.
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance, lower. court jurisprudence should
parallel what common sense dictates. Police standoffs are exigent from their
inception until the arrestee is finally in police Custody, and as such, a warrant
should not be required.
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